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ince the end of World War 11, economies
around the world havebeen plagued
by historically high and persistent
inflation. Thisraises a question: Ifinflation
is socially undesirable, why do policymak-
ers produce it? One explanation is that
discretionary monetary policy may lead to
an inflationarybias. This explanation is
based on the “time-inconsistency” prob-
lem, first outlined by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and illuminated by Barro and
Gordon (1983a). The typical version of
this explanation assumes that society
wants the monetary authority to follow a
low inflation policy, which it promises to
do. Once private agents commit them-
selves to nominal wage contracts based on
a low expected inflation rate, however, the
monetary authority is assumed to have an
incentive to create “surprise” inflation and
inflate away the realvalue of the contract-
ed nominal wage. As a result, firtns hire
more labor and produce more output. But,
because private agents are aware of this
incentive, they do not believe that the
central bank will carry through with its
promise to maintain inflation at a low
level. Hence, workers set their nominal
wages high enough so that the extra infla-
tion created by the central bank leaves real
wages at their desired levels. Consequently
no additional output or employment
is created hut society suffers from an
inflation bias.
For the past decade, researchers
have investigated an array of methods
with which to reduce this inflation bias.
Although most methods promise to lower
the inflation bias, they usually do so at the
cost of creating greater outputvariability
However, a recent proposal byWalsh
(1995a) and Persson and Tabellini
(1993)—the adoption of performance
contracts for central hankers—has created
a stir among economists working in this
area. The purpose of this article is to sur-
vey the work on performance contracts
and compare it to earlier proposals for mit-
igating the inflation bias. The remainder
of the paper proceeds as follows: The sec-
ond section contains a model describing
the basic time-inconsistency problem and
reviews previous suggestions for eliminat-
ing the inflationary bias. Following that is
a discussion of the nature ofperformance
contracts and how they work. The fourth
section probes the principal-agent nature
of central banking and its relationship to
central bank independence. In the final
section, 1 offer concluding comments.
A general description of how monetary
policy is determined would go something
like this: Society (the principal) delegates
the power to create money to the central
bank (the agent). Society instructs the central
bank to use its money creation powers to
“do good.” What is meant by doing good is
often not well-defined: nevertheless. it can
he interpreted to mean that the central bank
should produce a policy that improves the
well-being of society. The central bank then
enacts policy according to some objective
function. Presumably, its objective is to
maximize social welfare, but it could also he
to maximize something other than society’s
welfare. Finally, after policy is enacted, the
monetary authority may he asked to account
for its actions.







FEDEBAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
To illustrate the nature of the time- it now for comparison later. Equation 3
inconsistency problem, consider the looks very much like society’s utility func-
following version of the Barro and tion except that the central bank is
Gordon model: allowed to have a potentially different out-
put target, y’ + kM. than society’s. If kM =
(1) y =y~+ (iv — ire) + u then the central hank’s objective is identi-
cal to society’s. If kM * It
5
, then the central
bank uses policy to pursue an agenda that
(2) U5
= —(y It5)2— bit is different than that of society as a whole.
The reason the central bank has a different
agenda is important and is a crucial part of
(3) U’~=w— (y —y”-— kM )2~_bit2
, the performance-contract debate, as dis-
cussed later in this article. Finally for ease
of analysis, the monetary authority is
where yi sreal output, y’ is the trend level assumed to control the inflation rate
of output, iris the inflation rate, if is directly and thus chooses ir to maximize
the expected inflation rate and ai sa equation 3 given equation 1.
mean zero, serially uncorrelated real Consider the case in which the central
output shock. bank has only society’s interests at heart,
Equation 1 describes how output is that is, kM = It5
= It. Since society wants
influenced by inflation and inflation inflation to be zero (on average),suppose
expectations. Workers are assumed to sign the central bank can pre-commit to a policy
nominal wage contracts prior to the setting whereby it will not create systematic infla-
of monetary policy and the contracted tion. This implies that expected inflation
wage is based on the expected rate ofinfla- is zero. Substituting equation 1 into 3
tion. An inflation surprise reduces the real and maximizing subject to the constraint
value of the contracted nominal wage, kM = k5= 0 yieldswhat is called the socially
thereby inducing firms to hire more labor optimal or “pre-commitrnent” solution for
and produce more output. inflation and output:
Equation 2 is society’s utility function
and shows that society suffers from output
and inflation fluctuations about their tar- (4)
geted levels. Society’s target output level is
+ It5, where y’ is the natural or trend
level of output and It5 is a positive con-
stant. The parameter It5 is assumed to (5)
reflect society’s beliefthat distortions in
the economy make trend output undesir-
ably low. Society’s preferred inflation rate From equation 4, the central banker par-
is assumed to be zero. The parameter h daIly offsets the output shock by allowing
measures the relative weight society places inflation to vary more. Expected inflation
on losses arising from inflation. The is zero, and expected output is y’. In this
weight on losses arising from output has world, pre-commitment refers to the idea
been set equal to 1 for notational ease. that the central bank can commit itselfto
Equation 3 is assumed to be the central making the inflation rate zero on average,
banker’s objective function. The parame- hut will vary the period-by-period inflation
ter w is the salary or budget the central rate to stabilize output in a way that maxi-
banker receives for doing thejob. This mires social welfare. The central bank
term is irrelevant in the standard Barro and makes no attempt to expandoutput above
Gordon model and is usually ignored. But the trend level even though it has a desire
this term plays a key role in the perfor- to do so. In short, even though It > 0,
mance-contract literature, so I will include pre-commitment means the central bank is
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able to credibly promise to act as if It = 0.
Now suppose that the central bank
cannot commit itself to acting as if It = 0.
Now the central hanker chooses ir, taking
ir’ as given, to maximize its objective func




Rational expectations implies that ir’~













The only difference between these expres-
sions and those from the pre-comnritment
solution is that there is now an inflationary
hias, given by It57b > 0; output is the same.
Why does the inflation bias arise?
Because the target level of output is higher
than the trend value. Once wage contracts
are signed, the central bank can increase
output above trend by creating an inflation
surprise. The central bank does this not
out of self-interest hut because society
wants it to. Even though society as a
whole desires this, however, individual
agents have no incentive to allow their
wages to be inflated away Consequently
they set expectations and nominal wage
demands accordingly In equilihrium, the
economy suffers from excessive inflation
\vith no additional gains in output. It can
be shown that the loss from the discre-
tionary equilibrium is higher than it would
be in the pre-conunitinent case. Thus,
even though the central banker does what
society wants him to do, the use of discre-
tionary policy makes society worse off
in equilibrium.
There are three points to note about
equations 8 and 9. First, the inflation bias
is a constant—it is not a random variahLe
nor does it vary over time. Secotid, the
bias does not depend on the output shock.
Third, the stahilizatioti response to the
output shock ti is the same in both the
socially optimal solution and the discre-
tionary solution. These features all come
into play when discussing the optimal
design ofperformance contracts.
—
Since the publication of the Barro and
Gordon (1983a) paper, research has
focused on ways of eliminating this infla-
tionary bias. There have been two distinct
directions of research: the reputation-
building approach and the institutional-
design approach.
The reputation-building approach
focuses on the use of “punishment” strate-
gies by private agents to deter the central
hank from generating the inflatioti bias. In
these models, workers believe the central
hank will follow a low inflation policy as
long as it has not tried to surprise workers
in the past. Otherwise, they “punish” the
central bank by expecting a high inflation
rate, which the central hank validates to
avoid creating a recession, By using this
type of mechanism, the private sector is
able to persuade the central hanker to
develop a reputation for enacting the
announced policy Barro and Gordon
(1983h) showed that reputation building
would generate a lower inflation bias hut
wottid not eliminate it.
Barro and Gordon’s early model of rep-
tmtation was done under the assumption of
perfect infonnation. Subsequent research
examined how robust the reputation-
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huilditig approach was to information
imperfections. Canzoneri (1985) showed
that the economy would suffer inflation
“cycles” due to occasional breakdowns in
credibility if private agents were unable to
separate exogenous inflation shocks from
systematic policy actions. Backus and
Driffill (1985), Barro (1986) and Rogoff
(1987) showed that ifprivate agents are
unsure of the central banker’s type—infla-
tion hawk or dove—then a recession will
frequently occur early in a central hanker’s
term. This is because private agents’
expectations of inflation are an average of
the hawk’s and the dove’s equilibrium
inflation rates. If the central banker is a
hawk, inflation is set lower than expected
and a recession occurs. If the central
banker is a dove, he may act like a hawk
and create a recession to build a reputation
as a hawk. The reason is that if the dove
inflates immediately he reveals himself as
a dove and inflation expectations will be
higher for the remainder of his term in
office. By acting like a hasvk, lie manages
to keep inflation expectations low. The
dove, however, eventually chooses to cre-
ate an inflation surprise and expand out-
put for a short period of time. Thus, while
inflation is lower on average, output and
inflation are more variable.
Although reputation models are able
to generate lower equilibrium inflation
rates, albeit at sonic cost of greater output
variability they have several unappealing
aspects. First, there are an infinite number
of punishment strategies that cottld he
adopted, and it is not obvious which is the
correct one to use. For example, how long
should the punishment last?
Second, the multiplicity of strategies
suggests that private agents would have to
coordinate their actions to send a clear sig-
nal to the central hank as to how they
would behave in the event that they are
surprised. But how is such coordination
to he achieved? Large, national trade
unions may be sufficient for coordinating
actions in some countries, hut this is not a
feasible solution in the relatively atomistic
labor markets that characterize the
U.S. economy
Third, the reputation approach tends
to focus on the personahty and reputation
of individual central bankers. Because
individuals do not serve as the central
hanker for long periods in the real world,
this approach suggests that there will be
considerable uncertainty and variability of
policy as central bankers turn over, Thus,
we should focus on ways of developing the
institutional reputation of the central hank
instead of the reputation of individual cen-
tral bankers.
Finally the reliance on the private sec-
tor to enforce the appropriate path of mon-
etary policy is a hit unpleasant from a pub-
lic policy perspective, The reputation—
building approach does not try to change
the central hank’s objective function
directly; rather, it alters the central bank’s
behavior by making the policy choice
dynamic, that is, by making today’s policy
actions have future consequences. But if
the institutional structure of the central
bank provides it with the wrong policy
incentives, then it would seem prudent to
change the institution rather than rely on
private agents to solve the problem.
To illustrate this point, consider the
response to airline hijackings. One way of
dealing with hijackers is to arm the pas-
sengers and let them enforce peace on the
airplane. This is akin to what the reputa-
tion approach does for the inflation bias.
A better idea is to change the environment
for boarding a plane so that the likelihood
of a hijacking is reduced—hence, the use
of metal detectors.
As a result of these problems with the
reputation—based approach, researchers
began to investigate institutional reforms
for the central bank that would mitigate
the inflationary bias.
The institutional—design approach
focuses on using legislative means to
restrain the central bank from engaging in
high-inflation policies. The intent is to
manipulate the central bank’s objective
function directly through legislative
action. Some work in this area has
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focused on legislation that restricts the
day—to—day operating procedures of the
central bank; other research shows how
the appointment process for central
hankers can he used to elicit better infla-
tion performance. Advocates of the latter
line of research recommend making the
central hank independent from elected
leaders as a means of reducing the infla-
tionary bias.
Legislative restrictions on the
central bank often take the form of impos-
ing monetary targeting or adopting simple
rules (which are actually targeting regimes
with a horizon of one period). The adop-
tion of Friedmanesque k-percent rules
has been studied by Alesina (1988)
and Lohmann (1992). They show that
these rules eliminate not only the
inflationary bias, hut also stabilization
of output by the monetary authority
Hence, there isa trade-offbetween reducing
inflation and stabilizing output. Simple
rules dominate discretion when output
shocks are small and relatively rare.’
Multi-period targeting horizons
have been examined by Canzoneri (1985)
and Garfinkel and Oh (1993). In these
models, the central hank must follow
policies so that the targeted inflation rate
occurs on average over some time interval.
In this environment, the central hank
creates an inflation bias early in the
targeting horizon, hut it is sanaller than it
would have been in the absence of target-
ing. However, it produces sub-optimally
low inflation (or even deflation) at the
end of the targeting horizon to hit the
targeted inflation or money growth
rate. Stabilization is also sacrificed in
the naane of inflation, since shocks
early in the period are not stabilized
in an optimal fashion because those
actions anusthe reversed later in the
targeting period.
An implicit assumption in these tar-
geting models is that the central banker’s
worst penalty for missing the target is
di.smnissal (shooting him is not a realistic
punishment). Consequently the central
hanker’s self-interest plays a large hut
hidden role in these types of models,
The appointment and reappointment
of a central hanker who sets policy accord-
ing to his own self-interest plays a large
role in other institutional schemes for
dealing with the inflation hias. Thompson
(1981) and Rogoff (1985) proposed
appointing a “conservative” central hanker
who dislikes inflation tnore than everyone
else in society A conservative central
hanker generates a lower inflationary bias
but does so by not stabilizing the econoany
in a socially optimal fashion.2 To illustrate
this point, suppose that society appoints a
central hanker who puts more weight on
inflation than it does. The central banker
would then have a larger value of the para-
meter bin equation 3 to use in setting pol-
icy From equations 8 and 9, however.
‘we see that a larger value of b reduces
the inflation bias hut makes output
more variable.
For the conservative central hanker’s
policies to be credible, society must
helieve that he cannot be removed cx post
by the current government. Thus, the
central banker must have some degree of
independence to pursue policies that are
not desired hy the current administration
(and, implicitly the electorate). Subsequent
research by Flood and Izard (1989) and
Lohmann (1992) showed that complete
independence was not socially optimal—
for certain had states of the world, society
henefits from firing the conservative
central hanker and stabilizing output.
- w555M’4~555fl+
-
A consistent theme of both the repnta-
tion-httilding and institutional—design
models is that the inflation bias can he
reduced or eliminated, hut usually at the
cost of having the central hank reduce its
Recenily, Houbrich and kilter
(1995) have argued that this
comparison between simple
rules and discretion is biased in
favor of rules, because it
assumes that the choice
between adopting a simpie rule
aver discretion is a one-fine
decision. In fact, monetary
authority has the opton of
waiting before committing to
k-percent rule, ond this opton
has value that is typically
ignored in the Alesino and
lohnann analyses. Thus, they
argue thou discretion is more
likely to be preferred than is
typically shown.
2 Foust (1994) hos shown that
the appointment of a centrol
banker who prefers n lower
trend infation rote than the
median voter cnn improve
social weifare if the majority of
voters are net nominal debt
holders Stabilization issues,
however, are not studied in
Faust’s model
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lmpiricol evidence on this point
is mixed. For example, some
researchers have shown that
greater central honk indepen-
dence is associated with lovier
overage inflaion rates but has
no relatanship with the von’
once of GOP. Other work has
shown that countries with mdc’
pendent central banks tend to
suffer greater output losses dur-
ing disinflofions, which sug-
gests that there is a trade-off
between reducing inflation and
stobilizirrg output variability
Persson and Tabelliei (1993),
working from an early draft of
Walsh’s paper, extended his
approach to a mere general
framework.
emphasis on stabilizing output. Thus,
there appears to he a trade-off between
reducing average inflation and stabilizing
the real econoany’ Debate has centered on
the relative benefits and costs of this trade-
offin determining the goals of monetary
policy, and the types of legislative
restraints to place on the central hank.
Recently however, a new idea has sur-
faced in the institutional-design literature
for dealing with the inflation bias. The
idea is to offer the central hanker a perfor-
anance contract, xvhereby the central
banker’s salary or the bank’s budget is tied
directly to the perfortnance of important
anacroeconoanic variables such as GDP and
the inflation rate. By giving the central
banker the proper financial incentives,
these researchers have shown that the cen-
tral hank can be induced to generate low
inflation without forsaking its stabilization
responsibilities.
Pe.rtonnance Con#acss
Walsh (1995a) suggested that the mon-
etary policy gatne he viewed as aprincipal-
agentproblem.1 In a principal—agent
model, one individual or group (the prin-
cipal) delegates control over a policy vari-
able to another individlual or group (the
agent). Although the principal would like
the agent to set policy so that the princi-
pal’s welfare is maximized, the agent has a
different objective and opts for a policy
that does not give the principal its anost
desired outcome. The solution to this
problem is for the principal to offer the
agent a contract that gives the agent the
incentives to enact the policy desired by
the principal.
By viewing monetary policy as a prin-
cipal-agent tnodel, Walsh redirected atten-
tion uo the source of the problem—the
central hanker is confronted with a set of
preferences that do not yxeld the outcome
that society prefers most. So rather than
worry ahout appoiriung conservative ccxi—
tral hankers or adopting appropriate repu-
tation strategies, Walsh argued that we
should provide the central banker with the
incentives to “do the right thing—even if
those incentives do not appear, at first
glance, to be consistent with maximizing
society’s well-being. The problem isdeter-
mining what those incentives should he.
Folloxving the principal-agent litera-
ture, Walsh proposed offering the central
hank a performance contract. This con-
tract ties the central hanker’s personal
compensation or the size of the bank’s
budget to the performance of the economy
Once the contract is signed, society
encourages the central hanker to pursue
his own self-interest and adopt policies
that increase his income or the hank’s bud-
get. The trick is to structure the contract
in such a way that by trying to increase his
own resources, the central hanker maxi-
mires social welfare in the process.
This approach is a radically different
way to deal with policymakers. Under this
institutional design, society exploits the
pursuit of self—interest by the central
banker to achieve the socially desirable
outcome. This differs from the traditional
view of appointing a benevolent central
banker and then instructing him to do
good. Under the performance contract
approach, society essentially says: “You
can do whatyou want, hut you svifi pay
personally for undesirable outcomes.”
Making the central hank accountable for
its actions is a prominent theme of perfor-
mance contracts,
Desigrvi.nc-a Performance Cc-nIrot.i’
What does a perforxnance contract
look like? Consider the following coan-
pensation contract for setting the central
banker’s salary (iv in edluation 3):
(10)
where s denotes the central hanker’s hase
salary or the budget of the central hank.
This contract specifies that the central
hanker he paid a base salary s, which will
be reeluced if aaiy inflation occurs. The
degree of salary reduction ts dleterminedl by
the parameter 2. A key feature of this con-
tract is that it is based solely on the ptxl-
liely observed inflation rate; it is not hased
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on itemsthat areunverifiable (such ashow
hard the centralbankerworks).
Once the contract is in place, society
tells the centralbanker to set policy in any
manner he sees fit; thereis no mention of
pursuing the public good. Therefore,
given equations 1, 3 and 10, the central
banker chooses irto maximize
(11) 1JM=s_Ax_(y_y0~~kM)Z_bxZ.
This yields the following expression for
theinflation rate:
(12)
Imposing rational expectations yields the





(14) y = yR.~. 1’
Given these expressions for what inflation
and output will be when thecentral banker
pursues hisown self-interest, society
would like to set the weight A such that
the expressions in 13 and 14 are exactly
the same as those given by thepre-
commitment solutionsin equations 4
and 5. This result canbe accomplished
by setting:
(15) A=k’.
Bysetting A = W’, the reduction in salary
from creating an inflationsurprisejustoff-
sets any benefits that would accrue from
expandingoutput towardsy + kM. Hence,
on the margin, the loss ofincome for the
central banker is justequal to the utiLity
gain from creating surprise inflation and
expandingoutput,so he chooses not to
create surprise inflation and no inflation
bias occurs.
Furthermore,output andinflation are
stabilized in thesocially optimal fashion.
The reason this canbe accomplished is
that the inflationbias isconstant and inde-
pendentofthe outputshock it Soasitu-
pIe linearpenalty for inflationis sufficient
to deter the centralbank frominflating.
But the keypoint is that eliminatingthe
inflationbias through appropriate incen-
tivesdoes not requirethe centralbanker’s
stabilization response to be distorted.
Therefore, there is no cost for eliminating
the inflation bias. By careful construction
ofthe centralbanker’s compensation,soci-
etyis able to eliminate theinflation bias
and haveoutput optimallystabilized. This
isindeed a pleasant result.
The contract could takea varietyof
differentforms and still generate the opti-
mal outcome. Every contract, however,
musthave the feature that the centralbank
pays more attention to inflation (or less
attention to output) than society does.
This simply reflects Rogoff’s (1985) notion
of a conservative central banker. The only
differenceis that in Rogoff’s framework,
society carefully selects a centralbanker
whohas the “right” personal attributes to
reduce inflation, whereas the contract
approach gives anyarbitrarily chosen cen-
tral banker the appropriate incentives to
produce low inflation. In general, the
principleof RogoiTh idea is still relevant;
the issue is howto define “conservative.”
Rogoff’s definition of a conservative
centralbanker was someonewho put more
weighton inflation relative to stableout-
put. But we could define a conservative
central banker as someone whohas a
lower inflation rate target or loweroutput
target thantherest ofsociety. In all cases,
the centralbanker cares relativelymore
aboutinflationthan output.
For example, consider the following
performance contract:
(16) w=s_2hM(y_f)+(kM)l.
Inthis example, societysimply offers the
centralbankera contract that penalizes
himif outputis above the natural rate,
plus adds a fixed amount to the base salary
PIBEBAL RuSSIVI RANt 0’ It. 10US$
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according to the magnitude of kM.
Substituting 16 into 3 and rearranging
yields
(17) UM=s—(y—y’)1—&2.
The contract in 16 leads to an objec-
tive function for the central banker that is
equivalent to appointing a central hanker
with a lower output target than the rest of
society, since the parameter kM disappears.
With this contract the central banker will
use discretion to produce the socially opti-
mal outcome.
Alternatively, Svensson (1995) proposes
a contract of the form:
(18) w = s+2bg~— ~(g )2
where ii’ is an arbitrary constant to he
determined by society Substituting 18
into 3 and rearranging yields
(19) UM= s— (y~y’—kM)2--h(ff—~’ Y
If kM = k5, this contract looksvery much
like society’s utility function except that
the central hanker’s target inflation rate is
now different frotn zero. Thus, the con-
tract in 18 is observationally equivalent to
appointing a central hanker with a differ-
entinflation target than the rest of soci-
ety’s. A central hanker with this contract
will set policy such that, in equilibrium,







Notice that in setting ii~= — k”Vb. we
obtain the socially optimal solution, Thus,
by having the central hanker target a
desired inflation rate of minus the inElation
bias, society obtains its most preferred otit-
come. Because the central banker’s targeted
inflation rate is less than society’s preferred
rate, the central banker appears more con-
servative than the rest of society; in contrast
to Rogoff’s model, however, this type of
conservative central banker does not cause
stabilization to be sub-optimal.
The key point of this discussion is that
offering the central banker a performance
contract may be equivalent to appointing
an appropriately defined conservative cen-
tral hanker. Once we realize this, there is
no reason to believe that these central





In the performance contract approach
above, it was shown that appropriately
chosen contracts can induce the central
banker to produce the socially optimal
outcome. This result was demonstrated
without any reliance on the assumption
that the central banker~ output target was
equal to society’s. Walsh conducts his
analysis under the assumption that society
and the central banker have the same
objective functions, that is, kM = k5. This
assumption is common in the time-incon-
sistency literature, but is not consistent
with the principal-agent model. Usuallyin
a principal-agent problem, the agent has a
different objective than the principal. A
more classical depiction of the principal-




With this formulation, society has prefer-
ences that are consistent with the socially
optimal solution given in 4 and 5. The
central bank, on the other hand, wants
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output to he higher than its trend vaLue
(for some unspecified reason). Thus, the
central hanker uses his discretionary pow-
ers to create an inflation surprise, thereby
expanding output. Rational agents foresee
this and adjust wages so that they are not
fooled. The outcome is an inflation bias
with no additional output gains.
Although the story is the same as the
time-inconsistency model described above,
there is one fundamental difference:
Society does not want the central bank to
try to expand output above trend. The
central bank does so in pursuit of its own
self-interest. This situation is what perfor-
mance contracts were designed for: entic-
ing a “misbehaving” agent to produce the
principal’s desired policy
But if the performance contract gener-
ates the socially optimal outcome regard-
Less of whether society and the central
banker have the same output targets, why
is it important to classify the problem as a
time-inconsistency problem rather than a
principal-agent problem? The reason is
that if the policy game is described as the
principal-agent problem as in equations 22
and 23 above, the credibility of contract
enforcement is not an issue. The principal
very clearly wants the socially optimal pol-
icy to be implemented and has every
incentive to hold the central banker to the
contract and not renegotiate it. But in the
case in which the central hanker is trying
to give society what it wants, society is
inconsistent—it wants higher output,
which can only be achieved by being
“fooled;” yet, society does not want to he
fooled. Ifthe central hanker is maximizing
social welfare, then society should renege
on the performance contract once private
agents set their wages—it sin uld let itself
be fooled. Since it is optimal cx post to
renege on the performance contract, then
private agents will never believe it changes
the central hanker~s incentives, and we are
right back where we started.
The credibility of contract enforce-
ment raises an important point: Time-
inconsistency and principal-agent relation-
ships are not the same thing, even though
performance contracts appear to solve
both types of problems. Thus, one
needs to be careful in using solution
concepts interchangeably
Enforceability of the performance con-
tract corresponds to McCallum’s (1995)
second fallacy of central bank indepen-
dence. McCallum argues that a perfor-
mance contract “does not actuallyover-
come the motivation for dynamic inconsis-
tency; it merely relocates it” (p. 210). As
long as the central banker is presumed to
he maximizing social welfare, this argu-
ment is correct. But if the inflation bias is
actually the result of a “true” principal-
agent problem rather than a time-inconsis-
tency problem, society can pre-commit
itself to enforcing the contract.
Actually KcCallum’s criticism of
performance contracts is too strong.
While it is correct to say that a perfect
commitment technology or institutional
design does not exist (for example, even
the U.S. Constitution is not a perfect com-
mitment to liberty because we can change
it anytime we want), it is possible to make
the costs of reneging on promises more
costly and thus make monetary policy
more credible. The basic idea of perfor-
mance contracts, and the premise behind
the entire institutional-design literature,
is to increase the cost of reneging on a
cooperative arrangement. Some institu-
tions have low reneging costs (a policy
target), while others have very high reneg-
ing costs (abolishing the Fed). By relocat-
ing the source ofdynamic consistency,
performance contracts attempt to




In equations 22 and 23, the central
hanker has different objectives than soci-
ety as a whole in that he wants to increase
output above the current trend value. ‘[his
mathematical form corresponds to the tra-
ditional principal-agent problem. But why
would the central hank have an objective
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Actually, this maid imply that
the ceatial banker has a dille~
eat iafiataa rate target than
society’s rather than a different
oatput target.
that differs from what society wants?
The answer to this question lies in the
policy structure of most demnocracies. The
general public elects a leader who either
conducts policy himself or delegates the
control of policy to someone else.
Monetary policy typically fallsin thedele-
gation category In the United States, for
example, voters elect the President and
members of Congress who, in turn, dele-
gate the control of monetary policy to the
Federal Reserve. Although they delegate
control of monetary policy the President
and the Senate jointly determine who shall
serve as the head of the Federal Reserve.
Thus, there are typically three actors in
any monetary policy model: the voters,
the elected leaders and the central banker.
In the time-inconsistency model, all of
these actors are assumed to have the same
objective. From a principal-agent perspec-
tive, however, the presumption is that they
have differing objectives.
.me /coc/tJe Lenrmi
Consider the following principal-agent
problem. The voters and elected leaders
have the same policy objective, given by
equation 22, while the central banker has
the objective function given in 23. In this
case, the central hanker is a “rogue” policy-
maker who sets policy to maximize his
self-interest rather than society’s or the
elected leaders’ and who, by doing so,
creates an inflation bias.
Why would the central bank behave
this way? Central hankers maywant to
maximize their amenities such as the num-
ber ofstaff members, the luxuriance of
buildings and the size of travel budgets, all
of which are funded by excessive seigruor-
age creation.5 Or if the central hank is
unduly influenced by a special interest
group, say the banking/financial sector, it
may pursue policies that benefit these sec-
tors rather than society Regardless of the
source of the problem, perfortnance con-
tracts are adesirable way of dealing with
it. Society and the elected leaders use a
perfonnance contract to rein in the central
banker and make him accountable to the
electorate (why elected leaders do not sim-
ply take control of monetary policy then is
somewhat puzzling).
According to this scenario, central
hank independence is an undesirable insti-
tutional structure. The performance con-
tract approach can work only if the elected
leaders have control over the central hank
through the setting ofbudgets and salaries,
and the ability to dismiss the central
hanker over policy actions. For example,
Walsh (forthcoming) shows that ifadjust-
ing the hank’s budget and salaries is infea-
sible, then threatening to dismiss the cen-
tral banker if certain poor policy outcomes
arise can replicate the equilibria supported
by performance contracts. Walsh refers to
these optimally designed threats as “dis-
missal contracts,” since the central banker
knows exactly which conditions will lead
to his dismissal and agrees to such
an arrangement.
The implications for central hank
independence in this setting are very dif-
ferent from what is generally thought to
be. Central bank independence is general-
ly believed to he a crucial element of good
inflation performance, and the empirical
evidence to date is consistent with that
view (see Alesina and Summers, 1993).
Because of this theoretical and etnpirical
evidence, legislation has heen introduced
around the world that aims at increasing
the independence of central banks.
Why do the implications for central
hank independence forthcoming from the
principal-agent story described above dif-
fer so much from what is actually happen-
ing in the world? A likely explanation is
that this principal-agent story is not the
correct view
c~—c b<
Consider an alternative principal-
agent problem proposed by Fratianni, von
Fiagen and WaIler (1995). Suppose that
voters face an agency prohlem with elected
leaders. Voters want leaders to carry out
policies consistent with their objective
function in equation 22, hut leaders may
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have incentives to misuse monetary policy
for political reasons. For example, elected
leaders may follow policies that benefit
special interest groups or that further their
short-run re-election chances. Ifunusually
high levels of output increase an incum-
bent’s chances of being re-elected, he may
try to create surprise inflation to expand
output above trend. Furthermore, signifi-
cant partisanship in the policy process may
lead to a redistribution of resources that
does not promote the public good. These
are all reasons the elected leaders may
have an objective function similar to
equation 23, if they controlled monetary
policy directly
Ifelected leaders have an incentive to
misuse monetary policy it is in society’s
interest to delegate policy to a non-political
agent who will enact the policies desired by
the general public. This agent would have
society’s objective function as his own.
The problem is: How’ is this non-political
agent chosen? Elections will not work
since getting re-elected may he why policy
is misused in the first place. The central
banker needs to he appointed, but this is
typically done by the elected leaders.6
Thus, elected leaders can use appointment
or the threat of non-reappointment to
pressttre the central bank into implement-
ing policies aimed at helping the incum-
bent leaders. If the central hank’s budget
or the central bankers’ salaries are under
legislative control, then the central
hankers can be pressured through bud-
getary cues to pursue sub-optimal policies.
In this framework, the central bank
would like to do the right thing but its
immediate principal—the elected lead-
ers—have objectives that differ from the
general public. The elected leaders, not
the central bank, need to be made
accountable. Accordingly society benefits
by making the central hank as free of polit-
ical interference as possible. since inflation
will be reduced and output will be stabi-
lized optimally Thus, central hank inde-
pendence is crucial for good monetary pol-
icy; \vithout it, the central hank is merely a
veil for political leaders. Anything that
makes the central hanker~ appointment
and budget Less susceptible to political
pressure will lead to better monetary
policy’ This view of the principal-agent
nature of monetary policy has led academ-
ic economists to support the movement
toward greater central bank independence.
What would be the purpose of central
bank performance contracts in this latter
version of the principal-agent problem? If
the elected leaders are the ones who write
and enforce the central bank’s performance
contract, then they probably will not solve
the problem. Clearly enforcement of the
contracts would lack credibility since
elected leaders have an incentive to forgive
any transgressions the central bank makes
(as long as the transgressions benefit the
elected leaders).
Thereis one potentialbenefit ofusing
performance contracts in this environment.
Performancecontracts make policy more vis-
ible and the goals of the monetary authority
more transparent. Presumably this visibility
would lead to better policy actions, since
deviations from the socially optimal path
wouLd have to he explainedpublicly at speci-
fied intervalsof time. Individuals who
employ pohticai pressure on the central bank
would be brought into the public limelight
and the personal costs to elected leaders
from this attention, we hope, would deter
them from putting pressure on the central
hank. Furthermore, although it is a blunt
instrument, the ballotbox may provide
enough credibility in the enforcement of the
contract such thatbetter macroeconomic
performance would be achieved.
Although theoretically appealing, per-
formance contracts may notbe feasible in
practice. in fact, political infeasibility may
well be the reason we do not observe this
type ofinstitutional arrangement in the
real world. Nevertheless, the performance
contract research we see today could well
ttmrn out to be the foundation for the
design of central banks in the 21st century.
But we’ll need to try’ a few experiments
first to see how well theywork in practice.
New Zealand’s recent reforms of its central
6 The interested reader shauld
see Waler (1992, 1995) far
an example al such an appaiat
meat pracess.
WaIler (1992, 19951, Waler
aad Walsh (1995) and Aiesina
and Gatti (1995) shaw haw
reducing the degree af palifical
influence in the appaiutmeat
pracess rae lead ta saperiar
raacraecaaamic autcames.
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